We show that oblivious transfer can be based on a very general notion of asymmetric information di erence. We investigate a Universal Oblivious Transfer, denoted UOT(X; Y ), that gives Bob the freedom to access Alice's input X in an arbitrary way as long as he does not obtain full information about X. Alice does not learn which information Bob has chosen. We show that oblivious transfer can be reduced to a single execution of UOT(X; Y ) with Bob's knowledge Y restricted in terms of R enyi entropy of order > 1. For independently repeated UOT the reduction works even if only Bob's Shannon information is restricted, i.e. if H(XjY ) > 0 in every UOT(X; Y ). Our protocol requires that honest Bob obtains at least half of Alice's information X without error.
Introduction
Oblivious transfer is a cornerstone in the foundations of cryptography. Oblivious transfer was introduced some time ago in several variations Rab81, EGL83] and has since become the basis for realizing a broad class of interactive protocols, such as bit commitment, zero-knowledge proofs, and general secure multiparty computation Yao86, GMW87, GV88, Kil88] .
In this paper, we view oblivious transfer (OT) as asymmetric information distribution between two participants. An OT from Alice to Bob corresponds to a pair of correlated random variables X and Y with specially connected distributions. Alice's input X is transformed into Bob's output Y according to the speci cation of the OT protocol.
In Rabin's OT, Alice sends a bit that is received by Bob with probability 1 2 Rab81]; in chosen one-out-of-two OT, denoted by ? 2 1 -OT, Bob has the choice of obtaining one of two bits sent by Alice EGL83] . A generalized oblivious transfer (GOT) allows Bob to choose among all binary functions from Alice's two bits BCR86].
All of these are protocols in which Alice is willing to apply a probabilistic mapping to her information X, i.e., to send X over some channel X ! Y to Bob, where Bob may choose the Supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF).
channel hidden from Alice from a previously agreed-on set and/or the channel may add noise to the transmission. The question we investigate is: What if we allow Bob to choose from a much more general class of channels that is characterized only by the amount of information that observing the channel output gives about the input? The corresponding primitive is called a universal oblivious transfer (UOT) and has been proposed by Brassard and Cr epeau BC97] . For example, Bob could be allowed to read both of Alice's bits through a binary symmetric channel, which ips each bit independently with some probability. Or Bob could compute secretly any function of Alice's information as long as the function's range is smaller than its domain.
In terms of correlated random variables, UOT is a protocol in which Bob can choose P XY , the joint distribution of X and Y , subject only to an upper limit on the amount of information that Y will give him about X. (Naturally, his choice has to be consistent with P X , Alice's view of the UOT.) Bob can obtain some part of X without error; our reductions require this part to be at least one half of X, generally.
Key factors that distinguish di erent avors of UOT are whether repeated execution of UOT is allowed and which information measure is used to restrict Bob's knowledge.
As an example of UOT consider the black-box function model, as e.g. studied by Kilian Kil91] . This paper shows how a black box computing any function f with a certain property can be used as the basis for secure two-party protocols. (The extension to multi-party computation is given by Kushilevitz et al. KMO94] .) In the two-party case, Alice and Bob send their inputs to f over private channels to the black box but the output of f is public and available to both. The particular f computed by the box is known to Alice and Bob. UOT can be considered as a generalization of this scenario where the box is produced by Bob and f is unknown to Alice; she can only observe the size of the public output.
We stress that this work is not about realizing UOT in terms of other primitives (as e.g. IK97]). Furthermore, the results on general secure multiparty computation cited before imply that GOT and its extension to arbitrary lengths can be reduced to ? 2 1 -OT. (Such a reduction seems however not possible for UOT because Bob can choose to access Alice's information in in nitely many di erent ways.) The focus of UOT is to weaken Alice's security requirements in oblivious transfer by giving Bob more options to choose from. The question we investigate is how much freedom Bob can be given such that UOT still retains the power of oblivious transfer. The security of the reductions is statistical, tolerating an exponentially small failure probability and leakage of an exponentially small amount of information. -OT k can be reduced to repeated use of UOT are described in Section 5 and Section 6 examines a further generalization of UOT. We start with de ning terminology, assembling some tools, and introducing informationtheoretic notions.
Preliminaries
We consider four basic variants of oblivious transfer:
OT: In Rabin's OT, Alice sends a bit b and Bob receives either (\failed") or b, both with probability 1 2 , but Alice does not learn which one. Our reductions follow the information-theoretic de nitions of unconditional security for oblivious transfer and other multiparty protocols BCS96, BC97, DPP96], but formal treatment lies not in the scope of this paper. Informally, an OT protocol is correct if it accomplishes the transmission of information between honest parties. The protocol is private if a malicious party cannot obtain information about the honest party's input beyond the speci cation, except with negligible probability. Since UOT is by de nition perfectly private for Bob, privacy is only an issue with respect to Alice (against a malicious Bob).
We now repeat some de nitions of information theory CT91] and introduce the notation. A random variable X induces a probability distribution P X over an alphabet X. Random variables are denoted by capital letters. The cardinality of a set S is denoted by jSj and logarithms are to the base 2. Usually, the alphabet of a random variable is denoted by the corresponding script letter. Concatenation is denoted by or by juxtaposition. The (Shannon) entropy of a random variable X with probability distribution P X and alphabet X is de ned as
The binary entropy function is h(p) = ?p log p ? (1 ? p) log(1 ? p). The conditional entropy of X conditioned on a random variable Y is
where H(XjY = y) denotes the entropy of the conditional probability distribution P XjY =y .
The R enyi entropy of order of a random variable X with alphabet X is
for 0 and 6 = 1 R en61]. The limit of R enyi entropy for ! 1 is Shannon entropy. The other limiting case ! 1 is min-entropy, de ned as H 1 (X) = ? log max x2X
For a xed random variable X, R enyi entropy is a continuous positive decreasing function of . For 0 < < , we have H (X) H (X), with equality if and only if X is the uniform distribution over a subset of X. In particular log jXj H(X) H 2 (X) H 1 (X):
(1)
The well-known Fano inequality gives a lower bound on the error probability of guessing X from knowledge of a correlated random variable Y Entropy smoothing by universal hashing is a widely-used technique to concentrate the randomness inherent in a probability distribution known in di erent contexts as privacy ampli cation BBR86, BBCM95] or the leftover hash lemma ILL89].
In cryptography, privacy ampli cation can be used to extract a short secret key from shared information about which an adversary has partial knowledge. Assume Alice and Bob share a random variable W , while an eavesdropper Eve knows a correlated random variable V that summarizes her knowledge about W . The details of the distribution P W V , and thus of Eve's information V about W , are unknown to Alice and Bob, except that they assume a lower bound on the R enyi entropy of order 2 of P W jV =v for the particular value v that Eve observes.
Using a public channel, which is susceptible to eavesdropping but immune to tampering, Alice and Bob wish to agree on a function g such that Eve knows nearly nothing about g(W ). The following theorem shows that if Alice and Bob choose g at random from a universal hash function To apply the theorem in the described scenario, replace P X by the conditional probability distribution P W jV =v . The theorem can be extended from R enyi entropy of order 2 to any order > 1 Cac97b]. Proofs for applications of privacy ampli cation often involve spoiling knowledge BBCM95, Cac97a]: Suppose side information is made available to Bob by an oracle. The side information is tailored for Bob's distribution and serves the purpose of increasing his R enyi entropy of order 2. This can be exploited to extract a larger secret key by privacy ampli cation. Note that the oracle giving spoiling knowledge is used only as a proof technique and not for carrying out privacy ampli cation.
We will need the following lemma about the reduction of min-entropy induced by observing side information.
Lemma 2. Let X and U be random variables with alphabets X and U, respectively, and let s be a security parameter. With probability at least 1 ? 2 ?s , U takes on a value u for which H 1 (XjU = u) H 1 (X) ? log jUj ? s:
Proof. Let p 0 = 2 ?s =jUj. Then values u for which P U (u) < p 0 occur with probability less than 2 ?s . Thus, for all u with P U (u) p 0 and for any x P XjU=u (x) = P XU (x; u) P U (u)
The lemma follows by taking logarithms.
Universal Oblivious Transfer (UOT)
We introduce our notion of a universal oblivious transfer, in which only the amount of information that Bob obtains about the input is bounded and describe the protocol that is used for reducing string OT to UOT under several assumptions. Remark. The requirement that Bob \is not given complete information" about X is deliberately imprecise. In terms of entropy this could be expressed by the condition H(XjY ) > 0. But for the reductions to UOT, we usually need stronger and more complex assumptions about P XY . It is therefore the general idea of Bob choosing and obtaining some, but not all information that the notion of a universal oblivious transfer tries to capture. We insist, however, that the restriction of Bob's information is given in terms of an information measure, such as entropy. In particular, the size of Y is not explicitly bounded, as is the case for Since Bob's input to the UOT, the distributions P Y jX=x for x 2 X, is equivalent to specifying P XY consistent with Alice's P X , these formulations are used interchangeably. For the simplicity of notation, we assume that Alice's input to the UOT is a binary string of xed length. We use the following protocol to implement UOT and prove its security later with di erent restrictions on Bob's information about X. This protocol has been used by Brassard and Cr epeau for the e cient reduction of string OT to ? 2 1 -OT and to GOT BC97] . In the protocol and the security proofs in Section 4, X is a binary string of length 2n that is the concatenation of two n-bits strings X 0 and X 1 . However, X could be any uniformly distributed random variable with at least 2 2n values. The protocol implements a reduction of We rst investigate a single execution of UOT in Section 4. Then we slightly modify the protocol for Section 5 and examine the repeated use of UOT in step 2 of the protocol. It makes sense to distinguish these two cases: On the one hand, repetitions can often be treated independently of each other|such methods are used widely. On the other hand, there are scenarios in which repetition of an experiment does not help because the adversary is free to link repetitions arbitrarily.
UOT Without Repetition
We show under what conditions a k-bit string OT, 
Remark. In all our results, s is implicitly used as the security parameter. The resulting ? 2 1 -OT k protocol is perfectly private for Bob (Alice learns nothing about Bob's choice by the de nition of the UOT) and unconditionally private for Alice with leaking at most 2 ?s bits of information to Bob, except with probability 2 ?s . Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the protocol is correct. We show that Bob has substantial uncertainty about at least one of X 0 ; X 1 after step 3 of the protocol. From this we conclude that he obtains at most an exponentially small amount of information about either M 0 or M 1 and thus also about one of w 0 , w 1 because w 0 and w 1 are encrypted with a one-time pad using M 0 and M 1 as keys, respectively.
In the proof we examine Bob's uncertainty about X 0 and his uncertainty about X 1 given any particular value of X 0 . A similar argument applies with X 0 and X 1 interchanged.
First, we note that the main statement of the theorem (4) follows from the second statement (5) by the following observation. For any > 1 and any random variable V , it holds Therefore, if H (XjY = y) is at least ?1 times bigger than H 1 (XjY = y), the general bound (4) follows from (5). This leaves to prove the particular case (5). Fix the particular y that Bob has received. Suppose he obtains from an Oracle side information that depends on his distribution P X 0 jY =y . The purpose of side information is to induce an almost uniform distribution on Bob's view of X 0 . Although Bob may not actually receive the side information, he cannot deny having seen it and therefore have more knowledge.
The side information is the random variable U = f(X 0 ) with alphabet U = f0; : : : ; dg for some (Side information U of this type has also been called log-partition spoiling knowledge Cac97b]). U partitions the values of X 0 into sets of approximately equal probability under P X 0 jY =y;U =u . For d log jXj 0 = n, the values of the probability distributions P X 0 jY =y;U =u di er at most by a factor of two for all u except for u = d and therefore 1 2 max x 0 P X 0 jY =y;U =u (x 0 ) min x 0 P X 0 jY =y;U =u (x 0 ):
We now make sure that U 6 = d with high probability. Choosing d = n + s + 2 guarantees that for all x 0 . Either the min-entropy of X 0 or the min-entropy of X 1 given any particular value of X 0 is at least k + s. Privacy ampli cation transforms the n-bit strings X 0 and X 1 into the k-bit strings M 0 and M 1 . Because the min-entropy of a random variable is a lower bound for its R enyi entropy of order two, Theorem 1 guarantees that Bob's information about either M 0 or M 1 given any X 0 = x 0 is exponentially small in s. Formally, there is a value t 0 such that H 1 (X 0 jY = y; U = u) = t and H(M 0 jG 0 ; Y = y; U = u) k ? 2 k?t = ln 2 on the one hand and H 1 (X 1 jY = y; U = u; X 0 = x 0 ) H 1 (X 0 X 1 jY = y; U = u) ? t 2k + 2s ? t and H(M 1 jG 1 ; Y = y; U = u; X 0 = x 0 ) k ? 2 ?k+t?2s = ln 2 for any x 0 on the other hand. (To apply Theorem 1, we have made implicit use of (1).) At least one of the exponents is not greater than ?s. This analysis can fail in (7) or (8) with probability at most 2 ?s?1 each, so that the overall failure probability is bounded by 2 ?s .
In particular, the above theorem covers the case that Bob knows any deterministic function of X with output size no more than 2n ?l bits, i.e. such that Y = f(X) satis es log jYj 2n ?l. The following corollary is an immediate consequence of fact that P X is the uniform distribution over 2n-bit strings.
Corollary 4. Let s > 0 and let UOT(X; f(X)) be a universal oblivious transfer such that X is a 2n-bit string and Bob can obtain f(X) for any function f of his choice with output size at most 2n ? l bits, where n l 2k + log(n + s + 3) + 3s + 2. Then ? 2 1 -OT k string OT can be reduced to a single execution of UOT(X; f(X)).
As mentioned in Section 1.2, string OT can be reduced to generalized oblivious transfer (GOT), where Bob can obtain any binary function from a pair of bits held by Alice BC97]. The reduction from string OT uses GOT n times, so that Bob in fact can obtain any n-bit function of n pairs of bits that can be computed pairwise. Corollary 4 generalizes this to arbitrary n-bit functions of Alice's 2n bits.
We note that Theorem 3 is the most general result with respect to that we can obtain in Independent UOT: In the most restrictive case, Bob must choose all n UOT to be independent. For example, Bob would have the freedom to obtain all of Alice's bits over a discrete memoryless channel.
Dependent UOT: Bob can induce some dependence among successive UOT such that the resulting probability distribution can be seen as a discrete channel with memory.
Adaptive UOT: The most powerful strategy available to Bob is adaptive. Thus, he chooses the distribution for the i-th UOT based on the outcome of the rst i ? 1 UOT.
We consider rst independent UOT. In this case, Bob has to x P Y (i) jX (i) =x (i) for i = 1; : : : ; n in advance and his knowledge about X (i) is determined only by Y (i) . We show that if in every UOT Bob does not get the full information about Alice's bits in terms of Shannon entropy, then string OT can be realized from independent repetitions of UOT. ) denote Bob's optimal guess for X (i) and let p and the theorem follows from the Fano inequality and from Theorem 3 in a similar way as Theorem 5.
Extensions
In a UOT as described so far, Bob can always access at least half of X without error. It seems possible to extend UOT to the notion of a noisy UOT, where Bob cannot obtain even a small part of Alice's information without the chance of an error. In non-repeated use of noisy UOT, error correction has to succeed always except with negligible probability; methods similar to those used in worst-case communication complexity Orl90] can be employed to correct errors, but the matter is complicated by the fact that interaction is generally not possible or Alice could learn something about Bob's choice.
For an example of a noisy UOT, assume that in an UOT(X; Y ), any number of up to l bits in Alice's bit string X = X 0 X 1 , are ipped before it is sent over the channel selected by Bob. Then our protocol can still be used to reduce ? 2 1 -OT k to noisy UOT when Alice sends Bob also the syndromes of X 0 and X 1 using a linear systematic code that corrects up to l errors. (The reduction of Bob's entropy can be bounded by Lemma 2.)
In repeated use of noisy UOT, better error correction techniques can be applied and the scenario resembles the repeated use of a binary symmetric channel in work to reduce OT to a noisy channel from Alice to Bob CK88, Cr e97].
The noisy channel model di ers from UOT in another way: knowledge about the channel characteristics is symmetric for Alice and Bob (both of them know the transition probabilities). In contrast, UOT is inherently asymmetric. We raise the question whether there is a concept of information distribution between two parties that encompasses both UOT and the noisy channel model as special cases.
